A hostel is not a house

It concerned two derelict buildings on the Meyrick Family Estate in Bournemouth. They were acquired by Brightbest Limited at auction from a housing association in 2008. The first building was originally constructed in 1876 as a private dwelling house and had been used as such until 1927. The second building was a coach house to be used in connection with the main building.

In 1928 both buildings were acquired by the United Women’s Homes Association, and the main building was extended by the addition of a new wing. The newly enlarged building was then converted into 32 residential units to provide homes for ladies of limited means. The coach house was converted into two separate residential flats. Eventually both buildings fell vacant and then became derelict. It was at this point that the buildings were acquired and a notice of claim served.

The 1967 Act gives the tenant of a house under a long lease the right to acquire the freehold provided that certain conditions are met. The first condition is that the property qualifies as a “house”, which essentially means that it is a building “designed or adapted for living in” and “reasonably called a house”.

The judge decided to focus on the two most recent decisions of Hosebay v Day and Henley v Cohen, and also the unusual facts which he felt distinguished this case from a number of previous authorities.

Although there had been a change from a single family home to that of a home for a number of different women this did not mean that the property was no longer designed or adapted for living in. On the second part of the test, he felt that a building which had been so extensively converted into an institutional hostel could no longer reasonably be called a house. In view of this, the claim failed.

The judge also found that the cottage was not a house reasonably so called mainly due to the lack of connection between the two flats. In any event, it would have been excluded from the right to enfranchise because it was ancillary to the main building within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the 1967 Act.

The decision turned very much on its own facts given the individual nature and use of the buildings, but it does reinforce the view that a building used as a “hostel” will not be a house reasonably so called. It also clarifies the meaning of ancillary under Section 1(3). Where a building is constructed for the benefit of another and the terms of the lease support such a subordinate use then Section 1(3) will be engaged.